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In April 2019, British police officers stormed the Ecuadorean embassy and 
arrested Julian Assange for failing to appear in court, as well as for alleged repeat 
violations of international conventions during his time of tenure at the embassy.1 
Assange was granted diplomatic asylum by the Ecuadorean government in 
August 2012, and resided in the embassy up until his arrest in April 2019.2 
Assange’s extradition saga began in 2010 when the Swedish Prosecution 
Authority opened an investigation into a rape allegation against him.3 The 
Swedish investigation was ultimately dropped in November 2019, as a result of 
the weakened evidence caused by the passage of time.4 Assange served a fifty-
week jail sentence for skipping bail in the United Kingdom, while also awaiting 
his extradition hearing to determine whether he will be extradited to the United 
States.5 The hearing for reviewing the United States’ full extradition request was 
initially scheduled for February 2020, but has since been postponed due to the 
 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Arts in Government, Harvard 
University, 2017. I would like to thank Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell for inspiring me to write on 
the topic. I would also like to thank the members of the Notre Dame Journal of International & 
Comparative Law for their review of this note in preparation for publication.  
1 Julian Assange: A Timeline of Wikileaks Founder’s Case, BBC (Nov. 19, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11949341. 
2 Id.  
3 Bill Chappell, Swedish Prosecutor Ends Investigation into Julian Assange Over Rape Claims, NPR 
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/19/780743412/swedish-prosecutor-ends-
investigation-into-julian-assange-over-rape-claims. 
4 Id. In June 2013, a Swedish court denied the prosecuting authority’s request that Assange be detained 
“in abstentia” over the rape allegations. Id. 
5 Megan Specia, Julian Assange’s Extradition Hearing is Set for February, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/world/europe/assange-extradition-court-







2021 MODERN DAY EXTRADITION PRACTICE 139 
coronavirus pandemic.6 Assange’s extradition is founded on the eighteen-count 
superseding indictment (“Superseding Indictment”) that was unsealed in May 
2019, containing seventeen counts in violation of the Espionage Act, in addition 
to the computer hacking count in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act.7  
There are five sovereign states with potential jurisdictional claims over 
Julian Assange: Australia, Ecuador, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. The United States’ claims over Julian Assange hinge on his 
activities in connection to WikiLeaks, and in particular, his alleged conspiracy 
with Chelsea Manning to obtain and disclose classified documents related to 
national security.8 Australia’s claim over Assange stems from its right to protect 
its citizens, while Ecuador’s claim rests on Assange’s activities during his tenure 
at the embassy between 2010 and 2019.9 Sweden’s claims relate to the 
investigation into the rape allegation of Assange, which commenced at the time 
Assange entered the Ecuadorean embassy in 2010, but was eventually dropped 
at the end of 2019.10 Lastly, the United Kingdom maintains physical custody of 
Assange as he awaits the continuance of his extradition hearing.11 Ultimately, 
extradition law provides the best mechanism through which these competing 
jurisdictional claims can be evaluated.  
This Note examines modern extradition practice through an analysis of 
Assange’s extradition case. Assange’s case provides a particularly useful case 
study through which to examine modern day extradition treaties and principles, 
and whether these provide an adequate mechanism to facilitate international 
cooperation in the prosecution of increasingly complex transboundary crimes. 
More specifically, this Note will examine the evolution of extradition as a means 
by which states can protect and further their own policy objectives. Extradition 
evolved from a practice of gratuitous exchanges and comity between states, to a 
highly contractual system by which states are able to accept or reject extradition 
requests based on a variety of state interests. These substantive and procedural 
safeguards to extradition, such as prohibition against capital punishment and the 
 
 
6 Andrew MacAskill, UK Court Sets Assange U.S. Extradition Hearing for February 2020, REUTERS 
(June 14, 2019, 6:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wikileaks-assange/uk-court-sets-
assange-u-s-extradition-hearing-for-february-2020-idUSKCN1TF18S. See Lizzie Dearden, Julian 
Assange Extradition Hearing Paused Over Dears Lawyer Exposed to Coronavirus, INDEPENDENT 
(Sep. 10, 2020), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/julian-assange-extradition-hearing-
lawyer-coronavirus-court-update-b421437.html. Assange’s extradition hearing was recently 
postponed after concerns that an attorney might have been exposed to coronavirus.  
7 Dearden, supra note 6. This Note proceeds under the assumption that the May 2019 superseding 
indictment is the foundation of the United States’ full extradition request of Julian Assange, and 
therefore, that the criminal offenses that the United States seeks to prosecute Assange for are limited 
to those outlined in the May 2019 indictment. The subsequent analysis is the best assessment of the 
facts as has been made accessible to the public.   
8 Charlie Savage et al., Julian Assange Arrested in London as U.S. Unseals Hacking Conspiracy 
Indictment, N.Y. TIMES (April 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/world/europe/julian-
assange-wikileaks-ecuador-embassy.html.  
9 Stephen P. Mulligan, Frequently Asked Questions About the Julian Assange Charges, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., at 1-2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/LSB10291.pdf 
(last updated June 7, 2019).  
10 See generally the judicial authority in Sweden v. Julian Paul Assange, [2011] EW Misc 5 (MC) 
(http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/Misc/2011/5.html&query=(UK)+AND+(Sweden)+AND+(extradition)
+AND+(treaty) [hereinafter The judicial authority of Sweden v. Julian Paul Assange]. 
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political offense exception, provide legal discretionary means by which states 
can promote their own interests. Moreover, the shift in extradition machinery 
from that which was political to one that is legal in nature has resulted in a 
proliferation of extradition treaties encompassing a variety of state interests. I 
argue that the elusive nature of the political offense exception to extradition 
provides the requested state with the necessary discretion to reject extradition on 
self-serving grounds, which can fundamentally undermine the traditional 
purposes of extradition for fostering international cooperation. For the purposes 
of Assange’s extradition case, this development in modern extradition practice 
suggests that the discretionary nature of the exception provisions in the United 
Kingdom’s extradition treaty afford legal means by which the United Kingdom 
can serve its domestic interests when deciding whether or not to grant the 
extradition request. 
Part I of this Note provides a background of Julian Assange and the varying 
jurisdictional claims over him. Part II introduces the fundamental principles and 
evolution of extradition law, which are then applied to the United Kingdom 
Extradition Act of 2003 (“2003 Extradition Act”), which is the treaty governing 
Assange’s extradition. Part III analyzes the strength of both the United States’ 
and Sweden’s extradition claims over Assange, and the likelihood that each 
prevails under the 2003 Extradition Act. Lastly, Part IV considers the possibility 
of Assange being extradited from Sweden to the United States, if Sweden were 
to re-open its investigation into the rape allegation.  
 
 
I. BACKGROUND  
 
A. ABOUT JULIAN ASSANGE 
 
Julian Assange is an Australian national and the founder of WikiLeaks.12 
WikiLeaks is a non-profit organization that publishes news leaks and classified 
information provided by anonymous sources.13 Assange launched the website 
out of Sweden in 2006, given the strong domestic laws designed to protect the 
anonymity of reporter’s sources.14 WikiLeaks operates as a highly encrypted and 
anonymous drop box that that collects classified information obtained from 
“whistleblowers.”15 This encryption technology enables files to be moved 
anonymously across different computer systems, while also allowing 
information to be routed through countries that have strong laws protecting the 
freedom of the press.16 In one of its mass disclosures in 2010, WikiLeaks leaked 
hundreds of thousands of State Department cables, military reports related to the 
 
 
12 Mulligan, supra note 9, at 1. 
13 Id. WikiLeaks “specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise 
restricted official materials.” 
14 See Online Privacy Law: Sweden, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/online-
privacy-law/2012/sweden.php (last updated Jul. 24, 2020) ("Sweden was the first country in the 
world to enact a comprehensive statute to protect the privacy of personal data on computers when it 
adopted the Data Act in 1973. Certain personal freedoms, including the right to protection of 
personal data, are also found in the Swedish Constitution.”)  
15 Mulligan, supra note 9, at 3. 
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Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and Guantanamo Bay detainee assessments.17 
Assange was not initially charged for the disclosure, but was indicted in March 
2018 for one count of conspiracy to commit computer intrusion.18 In May 2019, 
the Department of Justice unsealed the Superseding Indictment charging 
Assange for conspiring with Chelsea Manning to obtain and disclose 
confidential information related to national security.19  
Around the same time as the 2010 disclosure, the Swedish Prosecution 
Authority issued a European arrest warrant for Assange for rape and sexual 
misconduct allegations.20 Assange, who was living in the United Kingdom at the 
time, turned himself in, and was later released on bail as he awaited the court’s 
ruling on whether he should be extradited to Sweden to assist with the 
investigation into the rape and sexual misconduct allegations.21 Following the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom’s rejection of Assange’s objections to 
extradition,22 Assange breached his bail conditions when he entered the 
Ecuadorean embassy, where he remained until his arrest in April 2019.23  
 
B. SORTING THROUGH COMPETING JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS OVER ASSANGE  
 
In order for a foreign state to assert a valid jurisdictional claim over an 
individual and their particular criminal conduct, it must first demonstrate that 
criminal laws extend to the particular criminal conduct at issue. With five 
countries with potential claims over Assange, it is necessary that each country 
assert jurisdiction over the relevant conduct under principles of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in international law. Under the governing principles of territoriality 
 
 
17 Id. at 1.  
18 Indictment, United States v. Assange, No. 1:18cr (E.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1153486/download (one count for conspiracy to 
commit computer intrusion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1030(a)(1), 1030(a)(2), 
1030(c)(2)(B)(ii)). 
19 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Assange, No. 1:18-cr-111 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1165556/download (“The superseding indictment 
alleges that beginning in late 2009, Assange and WikiLeaks actively solicited United States 
classified information, including by publishing a list of ‘Most Wanted Leaks’ that sought, among 
other things, classified documents. Manning responded to Assange’s solicitations by using access 
granted to her as an intelligence analyst to search for United States classified documents, and 
provided to Assange and WikiLeaks databases containing approximately 90,000 Afghanistan war-
related significant activity reports, 400,000 Iraq war-related significant activities reports, 800 
Guantanamo Bay detainee assessment briefs, and 250,000 U.S. Department of State cables. Many of 
these documents were classified at the Secret level, meaning that their unauthorized disclosure could 
cause serious damage to United States national security. Manning also provided rules of engagement 
files for the Iraq war, most of which were also classified at the Secret level and which delineated the 
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces would initiate or conduct combat 
engagement with other forces. The superseding indictment alleges that Manning and Assange 
engaged in real-time discussions regarding Manning’s transmission of classified records to Assange. 
The discussions also reflect that Assange actively encouraged Manning to provide more information 
and agreed to crack a password hash stored on U.S. Department of Defense computers connected to 
the Secret Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNet), a United States government network used for 
classified documents and communications. Assange is also charged with conspiracy to commit 
computer intrusion for agreeing to crack that password hash.”). 
20 Mulligan, supra note 9, at 1. 
21 Wikileaks Founder Julian Assange Freed on Bail, BBC (Dec. 16, 2010), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12005930.  
22 Assange v. The Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] UKSC 22, at 32 (appeal taken from Eng.), 
(May 30, 2012), https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2011-0264-judgment.pdf. 
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and extraterritoriality, it appears that the United Kingdom, United States, and 
Sweden possess outstanding claims over Assange.  
I begin by dispensing with any possible claim that Ecuador may possess 
over Assange. Ecuador alleges that Assange accessed the internet at the 
Ecuadorean embassy even after his access had been restricted following his 
interference with high profile political events.24 Whether these allegations are in 
fact accurate, and thus constitute a violation of the embassy’s terms of tenure, 
Ecuador’s decision to revoke Assange’s diplomatic protection, as well as 
Assange’s Ecuadorean citizenship, relinquishes any potential claim that Ecuador 
may possess over Assange. Even though the United Kingdom does not recognize 
the type of diplomatic asylum that was afforded to Assange at the time, it is a 
party to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.25 The Convention 
provides that diplomatic missions are inviolable and cannot be surrendered or 
entered into to conduct a physical search and seizure.26 Pursuant to Article 22 of 
the Convention, the head of the mission (consul) must provide consent for the 
receiving State to be allowed to enter mission. In this case, the Ecuadorian 
government consented to the United Kingdom’s police forces to enter the 
embassy and arrest Assange. Therefore, Ecuador cannot argue that the United 
Kingdom violated the inviolable nature of consular premises. By suspending 
Assange’s Ecuadorean citizenship to facilitate his arrest, Ecuador effectively 
relinquished any claim it could assert over Assange.27 
It seems unlikely that Australia has any outstanding claim over Assange. 
Australia’s only basis of jurisdiction over Assange would be under the active 
personality principle, in which a state can exercise jurisdiction over its nationals 
for crimes committed in another sovereign state. Each sovereign state has the 
obligation of ensuring that its nationals are afforded the rights afforded to all its 
citizens. Therefore, it would be reasonable for Australia to be concerned over 
the outcome to Assange’s extradition, especially relating to the possibility of the 
death penalty if Assange were to be extradited to the United States. Even though 
there have been concerns over Assange’s well-being, legal representatives in 
Australia have announced that they will not be interfering with the legal 
processes in the United Kingdom since doing so would be an interference into 
the United Kingdom’s sovereignty.28  
Sweden’s claim over Assange is premised on the principle of objective 
territoriality, under which Assange is being investigated for alleged rape and 
 
 
24 Ecuador Curbs Assange’s Internet to Halt U.S. Election “Interference,” BBC (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37699410. The embassy first restricted his internet 
access following allegations that Russians had used WikiLeaks to interfere with the presidential 
elections.  
25 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22, Apr. 18, 1961, U.N.S.T. 
26 Id. "The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter 
them, except with the consent of the head of the mission. The receiving State is under a special duty 
to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage 
and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The premises 
of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission 
shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution." 
27 Alexandria Valencia, After Years of Giving Refuge, Ecuador Suspends Assange’s Citizenship, 
REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2019, 8:36 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-assange-
citizenship/after-years-of-giving-refuge-ecuador-suspends-assanges-citizenship-idUSKCN1RN1LN. 
28 Australia Must Oppose Any Move to Extradite Julian Assange to US, Labor MP Says, THE 
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sexual molestation accusations that occurred within Sweden’s territory. The 
Swedish Prosecution Office began an investigation into the rape and sexual 
molestation allegations in 2010, but ultimately dropped the investigation into the 
sexual misconduct and unlawful coercion in 2015 following the expiration of 
the five-year statute of limitations.29 In May 2017, Sweden dropped its 
investigation into the rape allegation due to insufficient evidence that was 
needed to advance the case.30 In May 2019, the Swedish prosecutors reopened 
the rape investigation after concluding there was adequate “probable cause” that 
Assange committed the rape, but then proceeded to drop the investigation in 
November 2019.31 The statute of limitations on that rape allegation is due to 
expire August 2020.32 Therefore, the likelihood that Sweden is able to retake the 
investigation rests on its ability to  access Assange in order to obtain the 
necessary evidence to be able to charge him.  
Therefore, the decision rendered by the court as to Assange’s extradition 
request in February 2020 will have significant implications on whether or not 
the Swedish prosecutors pursue the investigation into the rape allegation before 
the statute of limitations expires.   
The United States’ claims over Assange rest on the full extradition request 
filed by the United States, pursuant to the governing extradition treaty between 
the United Kingdom and the United States (“2003 Extradition Act”).33 
Extradition treaties provide a mechanism through which sovereign states 
consent to enter into an affirmative obligation to extradite.34 The United States’ 
claims of Assange are based on the Superseding Indictment that charges 
Assange for conspiring with Manning to unlawfully obtain and disclose 
classified documents related to national security.35 The indictment charges 
Assange under one count of conspiracy to commit computer intrusion, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1030.36 Violations of any of the offenses under 
 
 
29 Julian Assange: Sweden Reopens Rape Investigation, BBC (May 13, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48253343. 
30 Id.  
31 Julian Assange: A Timeline of Wikileaks Founder’s Case, supra note 1. Sweden’s rape statute of 
limitations is ten years. Therefore, the statute of limitations on Assange is scheduled to run out in 
August 2020. Julian Assange: Sweden Reopens Rape Investigation, supra note 29. 
32 Julian Assange: Sweden Reopens Rape Investigation, supra note 29. 
33 See supra note 7 (discussing that this Note proceeds under the assumption that the Superseding 
Indictment forms the basis for the United States’ full extradition request of Assange).  
34 See Part III for discussion of extradition. 
35 WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange Charged in 18-Count Superseding Indictment, DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE (May 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wikileaks-founder-julian-assange-charged-
18-count-superseding-indictment. See also Affidavit, United States of America v. Julian Paul 
Assange (E.D. Va. 2017) (No. 17-MJ-611), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5912267/Assange-Affidavit.pdf. Assange was indicted 
based on a 2010 affidavit from materials received by Chelsea Manning in 2010.  
36 Superseding Indictment, supra note 19. Assange is charged under the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030). Assange is charged for one count under conspiracy to commit computer 
intrusion: “(A) to knowingly access a computer, without authorization and exceeding authorized 
access, to obtain information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to 
Executive order and statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of 
national defense and foreign relations, namely, documents relating to the national defense classified 
up to the SECRET level, with reason to believe that such information so obtained could be used to 
the injury of the United States and the advantage of any foreign nation, and to willfully 
communicate, deliver, transmit, and cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same, to 
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18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) or (b) are subject to a fine, up to ten years imprisonment, or 
both.37 Additionally, Assange is charged with seventeen counts of obtaining and 
disclosing national defense information, in violation of relevant sections of the 
Espionage Act under 18 U.S.C. § 793.38 Violations of any of the provisions 
under 18 U.S.C. § 793 are subject to a fine, up to ten years imprisonment, or 
both.39 It is worth noting the comparatively greater degree of aggression of the 
Trump Administration’s prosecution of Assange relative to that of the Obama 
Administration. Even though the Obama Administration spent years exploring 
the possibility of charging Assange for publishing classified information, it 
ultimately concluded that a prosecution would be challenged by protections 
provided by the freedom of press, since the prosecution of Assange would be 
comparable to prosecuting the New York Times and the Washington Post for 
performing the exact same functions.40 The Obama Administration 
contemplated prosecuting Assange for collaborating with Chelsea Manning in 
obtaining the classified documents, but ultimately concluded that there was not 
enough evidence (at the time) that Assange had in fact worked with Manning in 
obtaining the documents.41 It is worth noting that the Obama Administration 
never pursued prosecution under treason, since the chances of prevailing on such 
an offense are frustrated under the political offense exception to extradition.42 
The United Kingdom has physical custody of Assange, who awaits the 
continuance of his extradition hearing.43 The United Kingdom also has territorial 
 
 
or employee entitled to receive it.” Also, “(B) to intentionally access a computer, without 
authorization and exceeding authorized access, to obtain information from a department and agency 
of the United States in furtherance of a criminal act in violation of the laws of the United States, that 
is, a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 641, 793(c), and 793(e).” 
37 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (c)(1) (A) and (B). The statute provides a maximum sentence of ten years for first 
time convictions under § 1030 (c)(1) (A), and a maximum sentence of twenty years for those who 
have been previously convicted under the same statute pursuant to § 1030 (c)(1) (B). Assange faces a 
maximum sentence of ten years since he has not previously been convicted under the same statute. 
38 Superseding Indictment, supra note 19. The remaining seventeen counts charge Assange under 
relevant sections of the Espionage Act. Section 793(b) prohibits a person with “like intent, or reason” 
from obtaining or making copies of “any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, 
map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the 
national defense.” Section 793(c) establishes criminal liability for an individual who “receives or 
obtains or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain” before mentioned material related to national 
defense when the individual knows or has reason to believe that the material “has been or will be 
obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this chapter.” 
Section 793(d) prohibits the willful dissemination of material or information related to national 
defense by an individual that is lawfully in possession of such material. Section 793(e) prohibits the 
willful disclosure of material or information related to national defense by an individual that has 
unauthorized possession of such material. Lastly, Section 793(g) imposes criminal liability on two or 
more persons who conspire to violate any of the aforementioned provisions of the statute.   
39 STEPHEN MULLIGAN & JENNIFER K.  ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41404, Criminal 
Prohibitions on Leaks and Other Disclosures of Classified Defense Information 5 (2017). 
40 Glenn Greenwald, As the Obama DOJ Concluded, Prosecution of Julian Assange for Publishing 
Documents Poses Grave Threats to Press Freedom, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/11/16/as-the-obama-doj-concluded-prosecution-of-julian-assange-for-
publishing-documents-poses-grave-threats-to-press-freedom/. 
41 Id.  
42 DAVID SADOFF, BRINGING INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVES TO JUSTICE: EXTRADITION AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES, 199 (Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
43 Dearden, supra note 6. See also Julian Assange: A Timeline of Wikileaks Founder’s Case, supra 
note 1. In December 2010 there was a second extradition hearing that granted Assange bail. In 
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jurisdiction over Assange for failing to appear in court in violation of his bail 
conditions. That being said, Sweden retains a jurisdictional claim over Assange 
under the principle of objective territoriality. The alleged criminal offenses 
committed against Swedish nationals in Swedish territory could arguably 
present a stronger state interest when evaluated against a procedural violation 





A.  EXTRADITION TREATIES: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 
  
The shift in the historical practice of extradition reflects a shift in the 
international community’s criminal and political priorities.44 During ancient 
times and much of the Middle Ages, extradition functioned as an act of 
“courtesy” motivated by underlying “alliance-building interests” between 
country leaders and political counterparts.45 Following an influx in the number 
of political refugees in Eastern Europe in the 1830s, coupled with the expansion 
in the recognition of political asylum, states began to differentiate between 
individuals extradited for political offenses and those individuals extradited for 
other types of criminal offenses.46 While extradition originated as an occurrence 
driven by underlying political interests and gestures, by the nineteenth century, 
it had shifted to a “criminal phenomenon” where states relinquished individuals 
for ordinary crimes.47 The fundamental distinction between political and 
criminal acts began to crystalize in the nineteenth century following the passage 
of formal bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties founded on the principles 
of cooperation and suppression of crimes, including ordinary crimes and crimes 
of international nature.48 An additional development in extradition treaties 
resulted from increasing human rights considerations, such that “traditional 
ideas about comity and sovereignty gave way to a renewed interest in fairness.”49  
The shift away from extradition as a function of comity and courtesy to one 
governed primarily by state interests explains why states decided to enter 
binding international treaties with one another.50 Driven by self-motivating 
political and security interests, extradition developed into a treaty-based system 
of law by which states could overcome problems of international cooperation by 
 
 
an appeal to the 2011 extradition ruling in which the extradition ruling was upheld. In October 2019, 
the nine people that had posted bail for Assange were ordered by the court to pay the money due for 
Assange's failure to appear in court.  
44 SADOFF, supra note 42, at 131–32. 
45 Id. Importantly, these extraditions were based purely on acts of courtesy and of alliance-building 
interests, rather than being grounded on legal obligations stemming from bilateral and multilateral 
extradition treaties.  
46 Id. at 232. 
47 William Magnuson, The Domestic Politics of International Extradition, 52 VA. L. REV. 839, 851–52 
(2012). Common crimes that were historically excluded from extradition treaties became the main 
focus of extradition. 
48 SADOFF, supra note 42, at 131–132. 
49 Magnuson, supra note 47, at 853–54. “…courtesy and friendship between governments, has given 
way to new concern for the rights of individuals.” 
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incurring a legal obligation to extradite individuals for certain types of crimes.51 
Extradition is founded on fundamental principles of “sovereign respect and 
equality, reciprocity and comity.”52 More specifically, extradition treaties 
function as a means of facilitating international cooperation through the use of 
agreements permitting for the peaceful transfer of custody of individuals in order 
to achieve specific state objectives.53 Extradition treaties, in practical terms, 
facilitate the assignment of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction from one 
sovereign to another, effectively severing the entwined notion of jurisdiction and 
sovereignty as related to individuals’ perpetration of criminal offenses.54  
Extradition requests require a valid jurisdictional claim over the individual 
and acts committed. There are two types of jurisdiction in international law 
under which a state can assert a valid jurisdictional basis over an individual and 
criminal acts: territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction. Territorial jurisdiction 
states that a state has jurisdiction over crimes committed within its territorial 
boundaries based on the principle of national sovereignty.55 Under the subjective 
prong of territorial jurisdiction, a state has jurisdiction over a crime that was 
initiated in whole or in part within the sovereign territory.56 Under the objective 
prong of territorial jurisdiction, a state possesses jurisdiction over a crime that 
starts outside the territory, but which is completed, or causes injury, within the 
state territory.57 Extraterritorial jurisdiction exists when a state asserts 
jurisdiction over acts committed outside its sovereign borders. Under the active 
personality principle, a state can assert jurisdiction over its nationals for crimes 
they commit abroad.58 Similarly, the passive personality principle asserts 
jurisdiction over a national that is a victim of a crime committed in a sovereign 
country.59 The protective principle affirms that a state can prosecute non-
nationals for crimes they commit in a sovereign territory for acts that threaten to 
undermine the state’s governmental functions or public interest.60 Lastly, the 
universality principle provides any state with jurisdiction to prosecute the 
criminal offense that was committed in another sovereign state so long as the 
offense is one that “constitutes an offense against the international 
community.”61  
In addition to requiring a jurisdictional basis over an individual and acts 
committed by the individual, treaty law imposes additional requirements for the 
extradition treaty to be valid. There are two fundamental doctrines that must be 
 
 
51 SADOFF, supra note 42, at 133. 
52 Id. at 130–31, 134. Extradition employs a combination of both international law and national law, 
and is ultimately governed by the host states national law and political agenda. 
53 Id. at 130–131. (“such specific ends as the following: preventing impunity . . . [of those] in a ‘safe 
haven’ State; [s]trengthening law enforcement and crime prevention, [s]erving the interests of 
international cooperation and stability by promoting the use of agreements to transfer custody, and in 
so doing diminish political tensions and the likelihood of territorial invasion or war; . . . [protecting] 
procedural rights and basic protections.”) (internal citations omitted) (alteration from the original).  
54 Id. at 65. In order to prosecute, a state must have personal jurisdiction, creating a nexus between the 
state and the crime, as well as subject matter jurisdiction, creating a nexus between the state and the 
individual being prosecuted.  
55 Id. at 69. 
56 Id. at 73. 
57 Id. at 74. 
58 Id. at 77.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 84. 
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present in all extradition treaties: the doctrine of specialty and dual criminality. 
The doctrine of specialty provides the basis for extradition, and maintains that a 
state requesting extradition may only prosecute an individual for those criminal 
offenses explicitly consented to by the requested state through a complete 
extradition request.62 At its core, the doctrine protects a requested state’s 
sovereign right to limit the terms of surrender of an individual within its 
jurisdiction.63 The second principle is that of dual criminality, which requires 
the act for which extradition is sought to be a crime in both the requesting and 
requested state.64 The methodology adopted in the 1970s dispensed with the 
requirement that extradition treaties enumerate the precise criminal offenses and 
corresponding identical definitions, and instead require that the criminal 
offenses for which extradition is available have comparability in their underlying 
conduct.65 Even though extradition treaties operate as statutes in their relevant 
jurisdictions, they are still subject to procedural and substantive limitations 
under the relevant jurisdiction’s laws and policies.66  
 There are a few principal statutory bars to extradition that are worth 
noting. The first is the political offense exception, which excludes conduct that 
is either directly or indirectly political in nature from amounting to an 
extraditable offense.67 The exception emerged in response to a historical shift 
from distinguishing political offenses from all other criminal offenses during the 
influx of political refugees in Eastern Europe in the 1830s.68 The exception 
functionally operates as a “reservation” to an extradition request under the 
relevant extradition treaty, through which a state’s refusal to extradite is 
primarily left to the domestic court’s determination of the relevant facts related 
to domestic law and policies.69 The exception focuses solely on the political 
nature of the offense, rather than on possible political motivations behind the 
capture of the individual or any treatment amounting to political prejudice by 
the pursuing state.70 The international community has yet to adopt a universal 
definition of what constitutes a “political offense,” which, coupled with the 
inconsistent application of the exception, has not generated guiding principles 
for its application.71 That being said, political offenses have been categorized 
 
 
62 Carolyn Forstein, Challenging Extradition: The Doctrine of Specialty in Customary International 
Law, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 363 (2015). The “requesting state” refers to the state requesting 
the extradition, while the “requested state” refers to the state from which the extradition is sought.  
63 Id. at 374. 18 U.S.C. §3181 does not contain an obligation with respect to the Doctrine of Specialty, 
and instead requires that the doctrine be explicitly codified in the extradition treaty. See also United 
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) (holding that a requesting state cannot charge an individual 
that has been extradited for any offense other than those forming the basis of the extradition request, 
for which they were specifically extradited for). 
64 SADOFF, supra note 42, at 191–92. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 152. The basis for the extradition is the statute itself (extradition treaty), operating within the 
state’s relevant constitutional provisions, human rights obligations, and other procedural and 
administrative laws that are applicable in criminal procedures.  
67 Id. at 199. 
68 See Magnuson, supra note 47, at 851–52. 
69 SADOFF, supra note 42, at 199. 
70 Id.  
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into three types: pure, relative, and indirect.72 A handful of judicial tests have 
subsequently been developed to determine what offenses should be excluded for 
the purpose of extradition.73 The “political incidence” test is the most widely 
used test in both the United Kingdom and United States, and accounts for any 
criminal act that was committed while engaged in, or as a part of, a political 
struggle.74 Even with a specific judicial test at hand, the different circuits in the 
United States Court of Appeals have varied widely in their rulings as to the 
specific acts considered to fall within the exception.75  
In response to increasing concerns over human rights considerations, capital 
punishment has become another ground for a state’s decision to deny an 
extradition request.76 The refusal to extradite based on the possibility of capital 
punishment in the requesting state can stem from the requested state’s 
constitutional prohibitions on capital punishment, or even legal obligations 
incurred under relevant human rights treaties or international tribunal 
decisions.77 Statutes of limitation and discretionary time bars also prevent 
extradition where prosecution would not be allowed due to the amount of time 
that has transpired from the occurrence of the criminal offense.78 Statutes of 
limitation directly affect the doctrine of dual criminality, since a state law would 
be violated as a result of the time bar, thus failing to satisfy the requirement.79 
Meeting a state’s evidentiary standards can also impose significant obstacles to 
extradition.80 Common law states, unlike civil law states, impose evidentiary 
burdens that tend to require a requesting state to set forth sufficient evidence to 
make a prima facie showing of its grounds for extradition.81 Ultimately, the 
decision on whether the evidentiary standard has been satisfied is left to the 
discretion of the requested state.82  
The statutory and procedural bars previously discussed evolved much from 
the changing international attitudes and functions of extradition at the interstate 
level, as from the tailoring of extradition treaties in order to meet a state’s 
political and legal interests. One scholar argues that the variability and vast 
amount of exceptions to extradition obligations threaten to defeat extradition’s 
fundamental purpose of facilitating international cooperation, and are caused by 
two fundamental factors at play in extradition law: domestic institutions and 
interest groups.83 As discussed in the first part of this section, extradition 
 
 
72 Id. at 202–03. The pure form consists of political acts that are directed at the state itself, such as 
“treason, sedition, subversion, espionage, and conspiracy to overthrow the government.” The relative 
form consists of acts that have a “political agenda” or fall within a political context and are carried 
out as a common crime against private interests, such as airline hijacking or bombing. The indirect 
form consists of a crime that transpires in connection to an act that constitutes a political offense, 
such as stealing an item that is used for an attack on an embassy. 
73 Id. at 203. These include the “political incidence” test, the “injured rights” test, and the 
“predominant motive” test.  
74 Id. at 202. 
75 Id. at 204–05. For example, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that acts that indiscriminately target 
civilians are not “political.” The Ninth Circuit disagrees with this ruling. 
76 Id. at 311. 
77 Id. at 311–12. 
78 Id. at 212. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 215. 
81 Id. at 215–16. A prima facie showing generally provides for a lower showing than “probable cause.”  
82 Id.  
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originated as a political act of comity aimed at fostering positive relations 
between states.84 Arguably, the very fact that formal extradition treaties were not 
employed until recently seems to suggests that the fundamental purpose of 
extradition was very much geared towards fostering international cooperation, 
promoting uniformity amongst the means for extradition. With extradition 
serving almost diplomatic functions, the uniformity of the motives behind the 
practice might explain why formal bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties 
were not required.85 The function and scope of extradition expanded 
dramatically in the early nineteenth century once extraditions were being sought 
for a variety of criminal acts.86 This resulted in an increase in the number of 
extradition treaties, requiring requesting states to state their grounds for 
extradition under the treaty, while also imposing limitations on the types of 
crimes that were extraditable.87 The shift of extradition from a political to a legal 
process has ultimately resulted in the proliferation of extradition treaties 
encompassing a variety of state interests that can sometimes come into clash 
with the foundational purpose of fostering international cooperation. That being 
said, extradition as a “legal process” provides states with the necessary means 
through which to achieve their underlying political objectives.  
 
B. UNITED KINGDOM EXTRADITION ACT OF 2003 
 
These specific requirements can be further examined in the 2003 Extradition 
Act, which is the relevant treaty governing extradition between the United 
Kingdom and state-parties to the treaty.88 The 2003 Extradition Act creates 
separate procedural requirements for countries requesting extradition from 
outside the European Union, from extradition requests by members of the 
European Union.89 Pursuant to Part I of the 2003 Extradition Act, the United 
Kingdom and Sweden utilize the European arrest warrant through which a court 
in the United Kingdom is able to certify a warrant received by the relevant 
authority without the need of employing diplomatic means or scrutiny into the 
 
 
84 Id. at 853-54. 
85 See generally Magnuson, supra note 47, at 846–48. 
86 Magnuson, supra note 47, at 848. 
87 Id. at 849. This phenomenon consequently resulted in the involvement of national courts in the 
extradition process. Most national courts are called on at specific stages of the extradition process to 
make important legal decisions that end up playing an important role in shaping the extradition 
jurisprudence of a country. 
88 Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., Mar. 31, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 
07-426426426., [hereinafter 2003 Extradition Treaty]. 
89 Julian Assange Statement and Extradition Factsheet, Blog, GOV.UK (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2019/04/11/extradition-
factsheet/.https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2019/04/11/extradition-factsheet/. For instance, 
Sweden falls into “Category 1” for extradition, while the United States falls into “Category 2” for 
extradition. The extradition procedures for a “Category 1” country like Sweden require the 
following: the submission of a European arrest warrant (“EAW”); the issuance of a certificate 
(following the application of a proportionality test); arrest; an initial hearing; and the extradition 
hearing. The extradition procedures for a “Category 2” country such as the United States are as 
follows: filing an extradition request with the Secretary of State; a decision by the Secretary of State 
on whether to certify the request; a judge’s determination on whether to issue an arrest warrant; 
arrest; a preliminary and extradition hearing; and final decision by the Secretary of State on whether 
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substantive evidence against the individual whom the warrant is issued for.90 
Part II of the treaty governs extradition between the United Kingdom and the 
United States, requiring certain procedural steps by the requesting party: the 
issuance of a provisional arrest warrant (with a sixty-five day window for the 
submission of a full extradition request); that the warrant be issued to the Home 
Secretary, then forwarded to the court for final issuance of the warrant; a formal 
extradition hearing for the court to determine whether there are any prohibitions 
to extradition; and if the court determines there are no prohibitions, then the 
Home Secretary must order the extradition subject to certain exceptions.91 One 
additional consideration for any type of extradition request results from 
situations where two countries issue extradition requests on the same individual, 
in which case the Home Secretary must evaluate which of the two extradition 
requests to defer to.92 
There are some noteworthy procedural distinctions between extradition 
requests originating outside the European Union and those originating from 
within the European Union. One fundamental distinction rests on the 
requirement that extradition requests originating outside the European Union 
make a prima facie showing of guilt.93 Arguably, this higher evidentiary 
showing required of non-European Union members suggests that procedural 
safeguards incorporated into extradition treaties best serve as a means of 
protecting the state interests of the requested state. Another procedural safeguard 
incorporated into the 2003 Extradition Act appears in the exception to 
extradition in cases in which the criminal offense is punishable by death.94 This 
prohibition against capital punishment reflects the United Kingdom’s adoption 
of the international understanding that the death penalty is incompatible with 
human rights, and as a mechanism for protecting against incompatible interests 







90 Joanna Dawson, Extradition From the U.K.: What Next for Julian Assange?, HOUSE OF COMMONS 
LIBRARY (Apr. 23, 2019), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/world-affairs/europe/extradition-
from-the-uk-what-next-for-julian-assange/. 
91 Id. These exceptions include situations: (1) where the individual would face the death penalty (and the 
requesting state did not send adequate written assurances that it would not seek the death penalty); (2) 
where there are no arrangements in place, such that would violate the doctrine of specialty; and (3) 
where the individual has been extradited to the United Kingdom from another country. 
92 Julian Assange Statement and Extradition Factsheet, supra note 89. The Home Secretary must 
consider the following factors: the seriousness of the offense, the place where the offense occurred, 
the date in which the extradition request was issued, and whether the individual has been accused or 
convicted of the relevant offenses. He or she may also evaluate other factors, but these are required at 
a minimum. 
93 See 2003 Extradition Treaty, supra note 88. By contrast, countries that issue a European arrest warrant 
are only required to provide information “regarding the accusation or conviction, which is often 
presented in the form of an affidavit.” Extradition, THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/extradition (last updated May 12, 2020). 
94 2003 Extradition Treaty, supra note 88, at  art. 7. “When the offense for which extradition sought is 
punishable by death under the laws in the Requesting State and is not punishable by death under the 
laws in the Requested State, the executive authority in the Requested State may refuse extradition 
unless the Requesting State provides an assurance that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if 
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III. MODERN EXTRADITION PRACTICE: ASSANGE’S EXTRADITION CASE 
 
A. STANDING CLAIMS OVER ASSANGE  
 
 This section analyzes the United States’, the United Kingdom’s, and 
Sweden’s claims over Assange, and the likelihood that each claim will prevail 
under the 2003 Extradition Act. The extradition treaty reflects how the United 
Kingdom has sought to codify its political and legal interests with respect to each 
party to the treaty, and how these exceptions to traditional principles of 
extradition affect uniform notions aimed at fostering international cooperation. 
More specifically, the United Kingdom’s diplomatic and legal objectives with 
respect to Sweden and the United States are evidenced by the likelihood that 
each state’s extradition request prevails over the other. Importantly, the 
impediments to Assange’s extradition request under the 2003 Extradition Act 
reflects the means by which highly tailored modern extradition treaties frustrate 
extradition’s traditional ends of fostering international cooperation. I argue that 
the exceptions to extradition formalized in extradition treaties provide a 
requested state with the necessary legal discretion to make determinations 
furthering the state’s policy objectives, particularly through the political offense 
exception. For the purposes of Assange’s extradition case, this development in 
modern extradition practice suggests that the discretionary nature of the 
exception provisions in the United Kingdom’s extradition treaty afford legal 
means by which the United Kingdom can serve its own interests when deciding 
whether or not to grant the extradition request. 
 
B. THE UNITED STATES’ CLAIMS  
 
 First, I evaluate the likelihood that the United States will succeed on its 
extradition request of Assange pursuant to the relevant treaty provisions of the 
2003 Extradition Act. Proceeding under the presumption that the United States’ 
full extradition request of Assange consists of the Superseding Indictment, 
Assange is criminally charged with various counts for obtaining and disclosing 
national defense information and conspiring to commit computer intrusion.95 
Under the doctrine of specialty, the United States’ prosecution of Assange is 
limited to the criminal charges set forth in the indictment. Prosecution under the 
indicted criminal conduct would therefore satisfy the dual criminality 
requirement, since espionage and computer hacking are both criminal acts under 
the law of the United Kingdom.96 In addition to these doctrinal requirements, the 
United Kingdom must also determine whether there are any statutory bars to the 
extradition request.97 The United Kingdom’s determination on whether or not to 
grant extradition hinges primarily on two factors: the likelihood that Assange 
 
 
95 Superseding Indictment, supra note 19. 
96 Espionage is illegal under the Official Secrets Acts of 1911 and 1920. Computer hacking is also a 
crime pursuant to the Computer Misuse Act of 1990. See SADOFF, supra, note 42, at 191–92. To satisfy 
the requirement of dual criminality only requires general comparability in the conduct underlying the 
offense itself, rather than requiring the same name of the criminal conduct in the criminal statute itself.  
97 Mulligan, supra note 9, at 4. This statutory bar includes: the passage of time since the criminal conduct; 
the individual’s age or health conditions; compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; 
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will face capital punishment and Assange’s current defense to extradition under 
the political offense exception. While it is unlikely that Assange’s extradition 
request will be denied pursuant to the capital punishment exception, there are 
strong grounds for denying extradition under the political offense exception. 
Recent reports suggest concerns over Assange’s deteriorating health as he served 
out his jail sentence,98 which could serve as another factor when evaluating the 
likelihood of extradition.  
The first potential ground for refusing extradition rests on the possibility 
that Assange will face the death penalty if extradited to the United States. It is 
unlikely that this claim will prevail given the statutory requirements of the 
criminal offenses for which Assange is charged, as well as obligations under the 
doctrine of specialty. The limitation imposed on extradition of individuals that 
might be subject to capital punishment stems from the United Kingdom being a 
signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits the use 
of the death penalty.99 The United Kingdom explicitly included this limitation 
in Article 7 of the 2003 Extradition Act, which explicitly grants the requested 
state with discretion to refuse extradition in cases where an offense carries the 
possibility of the death penalty, unless the requesting state provides “an 
assurance” that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.100 The 
language of the provision does not provide any specifications as to what is 
required to satisfy the terms of “an assurance.” Moreover, the ambiguous 
language in the provision seems to suggest that the outcome of a decision on the 
adequacy of the assurance is a matter of discretion by the requested state.  
  The lack of specificity regarding the “assurance” requirement in the 
capital punishment provision reflects the fundamental concern over the United 
States extradition request: Can a country really gain the necessary assurances 
that a requesting country will not prosecute an individual beyond those crimes 
that appear in the extradition request? In evaluating whether or not to grant the 
extradition request, the United Kingdom must consider whether the United 
States will comply with its treaty obligations not to prosecute Assange under 
additional criminal charges that carry the possibility of the death penalty. In 
evaluating assurances for state compliance with international obligations, some 
factors that have been considered include; whether the assurance was provided 
by a state organ with the relevant authority, and whether the assurances 
 
 
98 Kayla Epstein, Reports of Julian Assange’s Health Suggest he ’Could Die in Prison,’ Dozens of 
Doctors Claim, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2019, 11:28 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/11/25/reports-julian-assanges-health-suggest-he-
could-die-prison-dozens-doctors-claim/. 
99 Mulligan, supra note 9, at 4. European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol No. 13 art. 1 at 55, 
Nov. 4 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. “The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to 
such penalty or executed.” 
100 2003 Extradition Treaty, supra note 88, at art. 7. “When the offense for which extradition sought is 
punishable by death under the laws in Requesting State and is not punishable by death under the laws 
in the Requested State, the executive authority in the Requested State may refuse extradition unless 
the Requesting State provides an assurance that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, 
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themselves were sufficiently clear.101 Even with such assurances, the issue of 
enforceability of these assurances remains.102 
Evaluating these factors in Assange’s extradition requires considering 
whether the Superseding Indictment, forming the basis of the United States’ 
extradition request of Assange, provides the necessary indicia that the United 
States will not seek the capital punishment of Assange. Assange is charged under 
certain provisions of the Espionage Act codified in 18 U.S.C. § 793, as well as 
for conspiracy to commit computer intrusion in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 
and 1030. Even though concerns have been raised over the possibility of the 
imposition of the death penalty in Assange’s case, the criminal offenses in the 
Superseding Indictment under which Assange is requested for extradition do not 
carry the possibility of the death penalty. The statutory maximum for the 
criminal offenses Assange is charged under do not include the possibility of the 
imposition of the death penalty, but instead carry a collective, maximum 
mandatory sentence of 175 years in prison.103 This statutorily imposed limitation 
demonstrates how domestic law can cut into the requesting state’s ability to seek 
sanctions that are contrary to those contemplated by the requested state. 
Moreover, the doctrine of specialty provides that Assange will only be 
prosecuted for those criminal offenses that are subject to the extradition request 
and approval. It is worth noting that Assange is being charged under § 793 rather 
than § 794 of the Espionage Act, the latter of which is the first statute to authorize 
capital punishment for “civilian peacetime espionage.”104 It could be that that 
the Department of Justice specifically chose to charge Assange under a statute 
that did not carry the possibility of capital punishment so as to avoid grounds for 
rejecting the extradition request. Even considering the relevant “assurance” 
factors to extradition, the requested state still has the discretion to deny an 
extradition request on grounds of the lack of relevant assurances.   
 The second ground for denying the extradition request rests on the 
political offense exception. Given the lack of an international uniformity in the 
application of the exception, coupled with its broad discretionary nature, the 
political offense exception would seem to be the strongest grounds for rejecting 
 
 
101 Ashley Deeks, Avoiding Transfers to Torture, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 9-10 (June 2008), 
https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2008/06/Assurances CSR35.pdf.  
102 The United States Government does not rely on any national law giving binding or enforceable effect 
to the assurances described in this Note. The real question is whether in each particular circumstance, 
in the backdrop of international practice, the court should accept these assurances as adequate. 
103 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Office of Pub. Affairs, WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange 
Charged in 18-Count Superseding Indictment: Charges Relating to Illegally Obtaining, Receiving, and 
Disclosing Classified Information (May 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wikileaks-founder-
julian-assange-charged-18-count-superseding-indictment. “If convicted, he faces a maximum penalty 
of 10 years in prison on each count except for conspiracy to commit computer intrusion, for which he 
faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less 
than the maximum penalties. A federal district judge will determine any sentence after taking into 
account the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.” 
104 See generally Mulligan & Elsea, supra note 39 (discussing Congress’s intent in passing the 
Espionage and Sabotage Act of 1954 was to allow for the execution of spies without requiring the 
complex legal argument utilized in the Rosenberg’s case). See Julius and Ethel Rosenberg Executed 
for Espionage, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/rosenbergs-executed (last 
updated June 17, 2020). Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed under the 1917 Act for providing 
information to the Russians about the atomic bomb. The 1917 Act allowed for capital punishment 
committed during times of war, and the unconstitutionality of this act was upheld by the Rosenberg 
court. That being said, no one has ever been sentenced to death for peacetime espionage under the 
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Assange’s extradition request. As discussed in Part II (a) of this Note, the 
political offense exception excludes conduct that is either directly or indirectly 
political in nature from amounting to an extraditable political offense.105 The 
exception functions as an important reservation by which a state can refuse to 
extradite on grounds that are primarily decided by national court’s determination 
of the relevant facts of the case in relation to domestic law and policies.106 Even 
though the United States employs the same “political incidence” test as the 
United Kingdom, there is still substantial variability in the application of the 
test.107 This variation in jurisprudence by the different circuits supports the 
notion that the political offense exception functions as a discretionary tool to 
serve the states’ interests.   
 The inquiry of Assange’s defense to extradition as a political offense 
exception hinges on the determination of domestic law and politics by the United 
Kingdom’s courts, with respect to acts purporting to be alleged violations of both 
the Espionage Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The conspiracy to 
commit computer intrusion, in violation of provisions of the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, present an obstacle to extradition under the political offense 
exception given the United Kingdom’s jurisprudence against extraditing 
individuals on hacking related charges.108 Interestingly, the decision to deny the 
extradition requests in these hacking related cases is coupled with concern over 
the individual’s mental or physical health conditions. Another factor that the 
United Kingdom must take into account when deciding on whether or not to 
extradite individuals on hacking related charges stems from the European 
Union’s laws which protect the freedom of the press as a fundamental right.109 
Furthermore, this right is codified in the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which has been in effect since 2009.110 The codification of 
the freedom of the press as a fundamental right safeguards journalists’ sources, 
in order for them not to be deterred from providing information to the press.111 
This in turn encourages access to public records that states might otherwise have 
a monopoly over and censorship of.112 The United Kingdom’s jurisprudence 
against extraditing individuals for computer hacking offenses, coupled with the 
 
 
105 SADOFF, supra note 42, at 199. 
106 See id. at 199–200. 
107 See id. at 202. 
108 Mulligan, supra note 9, at 4. See also Love v. The Government of the United States of America and 
Liberty, [2018] EWCH 172 (Admin) (where a UK court denied a US extradition request of a British 
national that had violated the CFAA as a result of hacking government computers, based on concerns 
for mental well-being, as well as concerns that the punishment would be unduly oppressive). See also 
Gary McKinnon Extradition to US Blocked by Theresa May, BBC (Oct. 16, 2012), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-19957138 (where Theresa May denied extradition because the 
individual was diagnosed with Asperger syndrome and depression). 
109 Eva-Maria Poptcheva, Press Freedom in the EU Legal Framework and Challenges, EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. SERV., Briefing (Apr. 2015). See European Convention on 
Human Rights supra note 99, at art. 10(1) (not absolute right but requires proportionality test – 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include the freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless 
of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises.”).  
110  Poptcheva, supra note 109, at 3-4. European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, art. 6(1), Dec. 
18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. 
111 Poptcheva, supra note 109, at 5. This fundamental right has been further upheld in rulings of the 
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freedom of press as a fundamental right, provide strong foundational basis under 
which to refuse the extradition request. The United Kingdom has a strong 
foundation for refusing extradition under the political offense exception, 
claiming that Assange’s procurement and disclosure of the documents for which 
he is charged with constitute a part of the United States’ “political struggle” 
against Wikileaks’ disclosure of its political activities, particularly related to 
foreign politics. Given the underlying discretionary function of the political 
offense exception, and both the United Kingdom’s and the European Union’s 
strong laws protecting journalist “sources,” there is ample support for the United 
Kingdom to refuse extradition under the political offense exception. 
Alternatively, the United Kingdom could argue that the underlying nature of the 
disclosure for which Assange is charged, pertaining to the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, as well as information relating to Guantanamo Bay detainees, is 
political in nature and therefore falls within the political offense exception.113 
The pending extradition case of Huawei’s CFO raises similar concerns 
about the political nature and motivations that can underscore extradition 
requests, thus providing a comparable case study for Assange’s extradition.114 
The United States filed an extradition request for Huawei’s CFO, Meng 
Wanzhou, on substantive and conspiratorial counts of bank and wire fraud in 
relation to circumventing United States’ sanctions on Iran.115 Commentators 
have made the case for the political offense exception, arguing the case arose in 
the context of the trade war between the United States and China, during which 
spokespersons in the United States claim Huawei poses a national security threat 
because China could use the company’s equipment for espionage.116 Wanzhou 
could argue that the extradition request is politically motivated, especially if she 
emphasizes that it was issued in the political backdrop of trade war with China, 
coupled with declining relations between the United States and Iran. Even 
though Assange’s extradition case presents different political facts, it similarly 
occurs in the backdrop of political tensions between the United States and 
foreign counterparts as related to computer hackings compromising national 
security.117 These political happenings form the basis for Assange’s extradition 
request, and therefore provide a strong argument for a defense to extradition 
under the political offense exception.  
Ultimately, the discretionary nature of the political offense exception would 
permit the United Kingdom to permissibly ground its refusal to extradite under 
its own domestic laws and policies aimed at preserving the freedom of the press 
as a fundamental right. Employing the political offense exception to extradition 
in such a way demonstrates how these exceptions to extradition in modern 
practice can undermine the traditional principles of extradition aimed at 
fostering international cooperation. That being said, exceptions to extradition 
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also permit states to retain certain degree of sovereignty when relinquishing 
jurisdictional claims over individuals.   
 
C. SWEDEN’S POTENTIAL CLAIMS  
 
Swedish prosecutors discontinued their rape investigation for a second time 
in November 2019, in light of the inability to extradite Assange during his tenure 
at the Ecuadorean embassy.118 Sweden’s Director of Public Prosecution did, 
however, make a statement that if Assange were to become available, Swedish 
authorities would be able to resume the investigation.119 That being said, Sweden 
has a ten-year statute of limitation on rape, which would schedule Assange’s 
rape charge to run out in August 2020.120  
If Sweden decided to re-open the rape investigation now that Assange’s 
diplomatic protection in the Ecuadorean embassy has been revoked, it could 
result in a delay or denial in granting the United States’ extradition request. Since 
Sweden initially requested Assange under a European arrest warrant, it employs 
simpler procedural mechanisms for granting extradition, as compared to those 
for extraditing to the United States.121 Moreover, Article 15 of the United States’ 
and United Kingdom’s extradition treaty requires a requesting state that receives 
multiple extradition requests to consider a list of relevant factors in order to 
determine which request shall ultimately prevail.122 The requested state must 
evaluate the following factors in making such a determination: whether requests 
were made pursuant to the treaty; the comparative seriousness of the offenses; 
the location where the offenses were committed; the potential for subsequent 
extradition between the requesting states; and the date in which the extradition 
requests were issued and subsequently received.123 The factor weighing most in 
favor of extraditing Assange to Sweden is the nature of the offense that occurred 
on Swedish territory, and whose prosecution was impeded as a result of 
Sweden’s inability to obtain jurisdiction over Assange. 
 There is one additional consideration in the analysis of Assange’s 
potential extradition to Sweden. If the United Kingdom were to extradite 
Assange to Sweden, there exists the possibility that he could then be extradited 
from Sweden to the United States after facing any obligations with Swedish law. 
Proceeding under the assumption that the United States’ extradition request to 
Sweden rests on the Superseding Indictment, the United States’ extradition 
request would have to be granted over Swedish laws’ strong protection of the 
reporter-resource relationship, as well as its protection of whistleblowers 
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following its recent 2016 law.124  Assange created Wikileaks out of Sweden 
precisely because of the protections afforded to whistleblowers under its 
freedom of expression laws, as well as Sweden’s historical practice of not 
prosecuting claims by foreign governments complaining about information 
published by Swedish media.125 Sweden would therefore have to balance its 
political interests in upholding its domestic press laws, and the essentialness of 





This Note examined modern extradition practice from its historical origins 
as a practice of gratuitous exchanges and comity between states, to a highly 
contractual system where states employ extradition treaties as a means to 
advance their underlying policy objectives. The traditional exceptions to 
extradition, such as the prohibition against capital punishment and the political 
offense exception, provide discretionary means by which states can accept or 
reject extradition requests based on a variety of state interests. I argued that the 
elusive nature of the political offense exception to extradition provides the 
requested state with the necessary discretion for which to reject extradition on 
self-serving grounds, which can fundamentally undermine the traditional 
purposes of extradition for fostering international cooperation. For the purposes 
of Assange’s extradition case, this development in modern extradition practice 
suggests that the discretionary nature of the exception provisions in the United 
Kingdom’s extradition treaty affords legal means by which the United Kingdom 
can serve its own interests when deciding whether or not to grant the extradition 
request. Giving due consideration to the United Kingdom’s interest in upholding 
its protections of the press, it is possible that the United Kingdom would reject 
the extradition request under the political offense exception. 
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